【Author's Note: This paper is published in Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2011(4)，pp. 609-627, (China) Higher Education Press, (German) Springer Press 2011.此文据《论“中国哲学”的意义困境》（载《四川大学学报》2010年3期）改写而成。】 

Abstract: The goal of “(modern) Chinese Philosophy” established during the period ofthe May 4th Movement is to reestablish the meaning of life for Chinese people. However, because it takes the approach of interpreting Chinese thinking through a Western lens, thus forming a discourse pattern of “Chinese A is Western B,” which is only capable of manifesting western culture, “Chinese Philosophy” is made logically impossible as the ideological source from which modern Chinese thinkers could construct the meaning of life. The ideological source of the still lasting traditional lifestyle is Yili Xue 义理学 (The Learning of Righteousness and Principles in classical Chinese philosophy); whereas that of modern life, which was established as an imitation of the West, is western culture. Neither of them takes “Chinese Philosophy” as its ideological source. Therefore, “Chinese Philosophy” is excluded from the construction of the meaning of life, and falls into the dilemma of life meaning.

Keywords: Yili Xue, meaning, ideological source, inquiry-response-action, interpretation 

1. Introduction

Along with the invasion of western powers and the introduction of western learning in modern times, Chinese people began to examine “the West”—a totally alien civilization. This examination resulted in a distinction between the West and China. While the former was defined as modern (or modern civilization), the latter, namely, pre-contact China, was defined as traditional (or traditional civilization). Today, we call the challenges that China faces the challenges of modernity. In the face of these challenges, Chinese civilization gave active responses. They manifested at the level of culture during the May 4th Movement and as the establishment of a distinctly modern “Chinese Philosophy.” The establishment of this modern “Chinese Philosophy” was supposed to not only respond to cultural challenges, but also to reconstruct the world of meaning (or ideological world, spiritual world) of China: In other words, to reconstruct a Chinese hermeneutic system of life and hence to support the revival of China. However, as a matter of fact, Chinese Philosophy from this period has never taken part in the construction of life in China; it has never been able to provide a meaning of life for Chinese people; it failed to achieve its intended purpose. This is a dilemma of meaning. The consideration of this dilemma gives rise to the topic of the present paper: How was this meaning constructed? How did “Chinese Philosophy” get into the dilemma?

Before the discussion, we need to make a brief distinction between three concepts: Classical Yili Xue, western Philosophy, and modern “Chinese Philosophy.” They are different in methods and goals. In Classical Yili Xue or Western Philosophy, the method and the objective are unified; they have their own goal and method, therefore they are self-defined and self-illustrated. However, the methods and goals of “Chinese Philosophy” are separated: its methods are that of western philosophy, and its goals are that of Classical Yili Xue. Modern “Chinese Philosophy” is the result of an effort to reinterpret Classical Yili Xue through western Philosophy. It was established as a way of interpreting “Chinese philosophy” through a western lens and its basic discourse pattern is “Chinese A is Western B.” This characteristic is fundamental. Moreover, modern “Chinese Philosophy,” established after the May 4th Movement by scholars such as Hu Shi, Feng Youlan and Mou Zongsan, has a very short history. As it belongs neither to the traditional nor the western paradigm of scholarship, it is herein put into quotation marks and given an inadequate name of “Chinese Philosophy,” or “Modern Chinese Philosophy.” Therefore, the concept “Chinese Philosophy” mentioned herein does not include the Classical Yili Xue, which existed before its establishment. Classical Yili Xue does not have fixed boundaries; however, it will be too loose to refer it as “national learning” or “ancient learning.” We use the term “Classical Yili Xue” (or “Yili Xue”) here in order to stress its inherent cultural core, from Yao and Shun to Confucius and Mencius and their lineages.

2. The Way of Constructing the Meaning of Life

2.1 The Inquiry-Response-Action Pattern of Life and Its Ideological Source

As we know, everyone’s behavior or lifestyle is directed by certain ideas. We pay attention to thinking or behavior; the idea of “directing” is always neglected. In fact, the idea of “directing” is worth of examination, as the way it generates is the way that the meaning of life is constructed. Based on this examination, we know that “Chinese Philosophy” is not able to provide direction for the life of Chinese people.

What makes the life of a human being different from the animal life is that humans can make their own lives meaningful. What is meaning? Meaning is not a “what”; it is an interpretation of one’s own life. Interpretation (or interpretation of life) is a construction (or construction of life); it provides a theoretical basis, conveying value to and support of the meaning of one’s own life.

How does interpretation provide meaning?

One lives and one has to “do something.” The question is: can one just do whatever one wants whenever one wants to? Isn’t some thought required? If one acts without restriction and overindulges, is that really being human? To think is to inquire before act. What does it mean to ask for inquiry? It means to ask “why” and “how” to act. These are two basic questions; “doing something” is open because of the two questions (and corresponding replies). How is it open? Inquiries point to and unfold actions, and make life open-ended. In an inquiry, “doing something” is self-disclosed as an active integration of both “why and “how.” In this active integration, what the “something” is does not matter. Peasants “farm,” workers “work,” officials “govern” and scholars “learn”; they take care of their own “something” respectively. Although the objects of their actions seem to vary greatly, the differences are not important. What really matters first is “why” one acts. There are two dimensions of “why”: “for what cause” and “for what end.” “For what cause” is retrospective, pointing to the past. Difficulties in life arise out of the context of one’s past; these difficulties form the problems to be faced. In contrast, “For what end” is a prospective question, pointing to the future. It means to attain certain objectives, which are the solutions for the problems of life; therefore “why” is an inquiry about what the action is intended to attain or solve. Hence “why” is in fact a combination of two questions: for what cause and for what end. The proposed objective of the action (thing) unfolds because of certain problems. The problem of life is always doubt about the present. Problems of the past are no longer problems. The problem is the instant unfolding of life and is manifested in the present context of life. Therefore, whether it is “for what cause” or “for what end,” the inquirer is always in his present context and raises his questions from this moment. What, then, is the cause, and thus the end of inquiry? It is either “for the cause of the problem of national crisis and for the end of the revival of the nation” (For the Dao), or “for the cause of living and for the end of rice and millet” (For the food); the difference between them is disharmony within similarity. They are similar because both are doing something, either research or politics. However, they are fundamentally disharmonious because of their different aims. (The following discussion will highlight the “for what end” dimension of the aim.) Whatever end it is for, such “what” is the reason for one’s action. Everyone has to do something for a certain “what,” i.e., to find a reason for doing something. Such a “what” is not waiting quietly for him; it is not manifested to his inquiry before he becomes the inquirer in asking “for what end to do it.” And whether the reason he inquired about finally manifests itself as his wish or not, he is after all expecting a reason to support his doing it. Whether he knows what the reason is and where it comes from or not, so long as he is acting, there is a reason supporting him. When he unconsciously supports his action with a subtle or hidden reason, such a reason for him is “daily in use yet unknown.” When he consciously takes a reason as the reason for his action, such a reason for him is “daily in use and known.” Therefore, a man of virtue has his way; a mean person has his way; and a robber also has his way. The first dimension of “having a way” is finding a reason for action. To find is to inquire; to inquire is to find. To find is to let the hidden or unknown manifest itself, therefore it is a (structure of) problem.

Now that he has inquired about “why to act,” and he knows “what” he will do, the next step will be to do it. Of course, he needs “to do” in doing something; yet action is not accomplished in a moment. Action is a process of effort. When considering the next step, the question of “how to” act comes up for inquiry. “How to” is an inquiry about the approach, path, or way. A man of virtue attains his goal in the way of a man of virtue, and a mean person attains his goal in the way of a mean person. Such a person always chooses such a way; and because he chooses such a way, he is such a person. That’s why Confucius said: “Richness and nobility are what everyone wants. However, if they are attained through an improper way, I won’t accept them. Poverty and humbleness are what everyone dislikes. However, if they cannot be cast off through a proper way, I won’t get rid of them” (“Liren” in The Analects). Therefore the second dimension of “having a way” is finding a path for action. Finding is also inquiring.

As an inquiry develops, who responds to it? The inquirer always supposes, either consciously or unconsciously, a responder. The responder is the ideological source of the inquiry. The responder is not ready-at-hand; he becomes a responder when the inquirer asks. If the inquirer knows his responder clearly, the ideological source is daily in use and known for him. If the inquirer is not clear about his responder, the ideological source for him is daily in use yet unknown.

In the inquiry, “something” is unfolded. It is unfolded in the inquiry and the corresponding response, as well as in the immediate actions, and manifests in a pattern of “inquiry-response-action.” Inquiry-response-action is the “something”; it is life. The inquiry: “Why should I act?” The response: “To act for such and such a reason.” The inquiry again: “How should I act?” The response: “Act in such a way.” And then there is instantly the action. Such is the “something.” A thing as a thing has already implicated “doing”; doing as doing also has implicated some “thing.” A thing is always “doing” a thing; and doing is always doing some “thing.” The discrimination of doing, thing and doing thing exists merely when we specifically consider their differences; they are identical in common principles. Therefore, there is not a “thing” in the sense of a noun. The usually assumed difference between two things is not the difference of one thing from the other (for example, like the difference between labor work and politics); it is the difference between “why” and “how.” The different causes and approaches for which and in which the inquiry opens are the real differences. And the differences between ends are the most important.

In the inquiry, the thing is unfolded, life is opened, and meaning is constructed. Meaning is nothing but the “what” and “how” revealed by the inquiry and the unfolding of actions; this is the action pattern of inquiry-response-action. Such a pattern of action is the form of life; action seems to involve one thing and life is connected to many things. However, such a distinction makes little sense. Although there are many things in life, everything is instant for itself. Everything is life instantly unfolded and the instant form of life. In the pattern of inquiry-response-action, everyone asks for his personal (world of) meaning. Therefore, “to have a way” is in its primary sense constructing meaning; it supplies life with a theoretical basis, conveying meaning to support and justify life. It is an interpretation of life. Anyone, so long as he inquires, has his meaning of life. Since everyone, before doing something, inquires in order to find the reason and path for his action, he is definitely constructing his meaning of life. However, the inquiry-response-action patterns of people in different cultural contexts open different meanings (or specific life structures) with their different ideological sources. Such differences give rise to various cultures. Moreover, the inquiry of anyone from any cultural context does not decide the good or bad of his reason and approach opened by inquiry-response-action pattern. Some claim that a certain theory is good for living, while others claim it is harmful for living. When we say that both the man of virtue and the mean person have their own ways, we mean both good and evil actions have their own causes and reasons. Even for the worst person in the world, there is something that he will not do; he has to think and consider his options when acting. To think is to inquire. To consider options is to choose between alternatives and to act after deliberation. To think about and consider options is to find a reason and a way for action. Therefore, everyone is constructing his meaning.

And originally, anyone’s meaning construction is his own construction, depending solely upon himself (his own inquiry and its unfolding), rather than on someone else’s judgment. Meaning is generated and constructed by itself (the “one”), whereas value, which implies measure by the public (the “many”), is the result of distinction, comparison and judgment between many people. The origin of personal meaning construction is the “Way” in his assumption; whether or not the “Way” will be acknowledged by other people is the issue for the next step, forming a value judgment through public judgment. Therefore when one says that another’s life is meaningful or meaningless, he is making his own judgment of value according to his own criteria.

2.2. Inquiry and Cross-Examination

An inquiry expects an answer (a result) and gets “what” and “how,” which are used to construct and unfold life. Inquiries in life always get answers and thus life is unfolded steadily.

Inquiry opens life. Everything in life comes from the guidance of inquiry. The question: “Why should I act?” The answer: “For the revival of the nation.” The question again: “How can the nation be revived?” The answer: “Through education.” With the guidance of inquiry, the answer emerges from obscurity to explicitness—a process of life is opened and meaning constructed. It is further turned into seeing, listening, speaking and acting, constituting the life pattern of inquiry-response-action. “To learn for the revival of the nation” is the life pattern of inquiry-response-action opened by the inquiry; and such a pattern is self-driven and self-sufficient in order to be integration of life (or integration of actions). Why is it self-driven and self-sufficient? Actions make the thing unfolded in the reason and approach opened by the inquiry; hence it is self-sufficient to be integration. Inquiry, response, and action are the results of one’s own will rather than the results of external compulsion, therefore it is self-driven (the so-called external compulsion must be internalized and in the end come from the inquirer himself). Being self-driven and self-sufficient, the inquiry about the thing terminates and the present life form—the integration—is unfolded. The termination of inquiry does not mean the end of inquiry; it means that in the direction of the inquiry, the present thing has unfolded by itself in inquiry-response-action; hence inquiry is no longer necessary. Inquiry happens continuously in life; it is immediate. If one encounters new “problems,” or a new “something” in the constantly changing life circumstances, a new round of inquiries will be necessary. New inquiry as a new “something” opens separately and happens continuously, pointing to new life occurrences, unfolding new life form—integration—of inquiry-answer-action, and making new interpretations of life and constructing new meanings.

The inquirer inquires in order to act. Therefore he always expects that the answer is definite; and the answer is surely often definite, thus the life is stable. Definite answers enable the inquirer to act immediately for the “what” and in the way of “how,” opening his (world of) life and constructing his (world of) meaning. The answer to the inquirer is not an external object, but is the manifestation of his life. The definiteness of the answer has nothing to do with the frequently discussed ready-at-handness and objectification in today’s academia. To be definite does not mean to have a definite object. On the contrary, it means that the inquirer, in the process of inquiry-response, has determined what to do and how to do it, and he does it right away. It belongs to inquiry and response and makes inquiry-response-action a unity, hence it settles down the inquirer. Therefore in the construction of life, inquiry is supposed to seek to settle down the inquirer and to provide some justification for his life, while the definiteness of the answer ensures that justification is acquired and hence enables the inquirer to settle down and let his life unfold. From the perspective of history or tradition, it is such definiteness—both the predecessors and the successors are likely to find a similar answer in a similar inquiry—that allows tradition to be handed down generation after generation.

Therefore, the inquiry into life is different from academic cross-examination. Inquiry is self-sufficient and immediately turns into action. Cross-examination is often not self-sufficient, because our life consists in many things that are not naturally self-sufficient. There are dilemmas in our lives. To be in a dilemma means to be beset by certain circumstances and unable to move forward. In such circumstances one is incapable of getting the answer when he inquires. As a result, life fails to move forward, meaning cannot be constructed, and people are at loss as to what to do. Cross-examination is an objectification of the dilemma of life. It forms an academic topic in anticipation of an ideologically or theoretically complete solution so as to get rid of the dilemma.

“Wasn’t he who wrote the Yi living with anxiety and calamity?” (“Xici” in I Ching) Sages and scholars concerned with people’s lives examine the dilemmas of life in order to find a way out. That’s why we say: anxiety and calamity are the roots of academic research. Real academic research faces the dilemmas of life. It is devoted “to settling down the general populace” and to searching for a better answer to respond to the inquiry of “what for” and “how to.” Such a searching is cross-examination. Cross-examination is supposed to respond to the inquiry, so it should not forget its aim. Therefore academic research should also respond to life, and should not forget its objective in academic activities.

The general populaces inquire, but they do not cross-examine. A scholar should on the one hand inquire as a member of the general populace, and on the other hand cross-examine as a scholar.

2.3 The Yili Xue that Interprets Life

The Yili Xue is not a system of knowledge about the physical world; it is a system of interpreting life aimed at settling down the general populace. It is mainly about proper handling of various interpersonal relationships, including those within a family, the relationships in the neighborhood, between friends and colleagues, as well as between nations and among the members of society. It aims at directing people’s actions and constructing the meaning of life. People inquire about their lives and these inquiries point to the Yili Xue. The Yili Xue opens itself to inquiry. It responds to inquiry, unfolds life, and constructs the meaning of life. Thus, in the unity of the people’s inquiry, the Yili Xue’s response and the people’s actions, the Yili Xue became the ideological source for interpreting the life and realizing itself. Zhuangzi said: “The Way is accomplished through walking” (“Qiwu Lun” in Zhuangzi). It is only through practice in life that the Yili Xue would be able to realize itself. Chen Chun 陈淳 said: “The main points of the Dao are but the principles in everyday life.” “All the things in everyday life—as trivial as house duties such as watering and sweeping, and good manners in social contacts, as great as assisting the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth—are grown from and unified in this Great Root” (The term “Dao” and “Yi Guan” in Chen 1983). Wang Yangming criticized his contemporaries, saying that they “should abandon their knowledge before they are able to follow the Sages upward” (Wang 1992). All these indicate that the Yili Xue tells people how to behave and live. The general populaces turn to the Yili Xue for inquiry, and it responds. Its interpretation of life is carried out through all the things in everyday life. Therefore, the Yili Xue is the way of life.

Where is the way of life conveyed? The answer is: the texts, especially the classics, of the Yili Xue. Classics are classics not because they teach eternal laws or unchangeable truths, but because they convey the lasting and profound national lifestyle of China. Chinese history as a history of the “Chinese” nationality is unfolded on the basis of the classics of the Yili Xue and in the process of inquiry and response between the general populace and the Yili Xue. Zhou Yi 周易 (I Ching or The Book of Change of Zhou Dynasty), Shang Shu 尚书 (Books of Antiquity), and Li Ji 礼记 (Records of Rites) are records of the life experience of the Chinese nationality; they are the textual form of China.

In order to be the classics of the Chinese nationality, the classics of the Yili Xue have to be the ideological source for interpreting the life of China, responding to the inquiry of China (and its people), and constructing the meaning of national life. However, this does not mean that the ideological source used to construct the meaning of life has to be in the form of texts, neither does it mean that the general populace must clearly know these ideological sources. Ideological sources may well be ready-at-hand and objectified in the form of a text; but the ready-at-hand text is neither the primordial form of the ideological source, nor the final form—it is a derivative and transitional form. It is not only that the textual form of these ideological sources—for example, the classics of the Yili Xue—comes from life, but that if it intends to continue to be the ideological source, it has to return to life and be understood by the general populace through direct reading or personal instruction, so that the people could, consciously or unconsciously, draw upon the ideological source that has been restored to non-ready-at-hand and non-objectified texts in his understanding. The ideological source has been the ideological source before it is used by the general populace. If the Yili Xue does decline, it is not because of the loss of texts, but because the Yili Xue has been expelled from life. As the Chinese nationality no longer draws on the Yili Xue, the latter does not respond. The lifestyle of Chinese nationality retreats into the state of no inquiry and no response. It retreats to the texts and is no longer a vividly flowing ideological source. Retreat may lead to the degradation of the Yili Xue in its ability to be ready-at-hand texts—it may become the mere material for historians (Levenson said that Confucianism will be stored in museum. See Levenson 1968, p. 77, p. 113). Of course, the Yili Xue may emerge once again, as it is not completely hidden; it is alienated from us but not completely cut off from us. Only with the inquiry of the Chinese nationality (and Chinese people) can the Yili Xue again respond to life.

The way that the meaning of life is constructed mentioned above does not rely on any theory. Everyone could verify this way of inquiry-response-action with his own experience. Such an approach, i.e., explaining the construction of meaning of life, is more convincing than those relying on any given theory. From the above analysis we know that “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy” is in a dilemma of meaning.

3. Subsistence Dilemma of the Discourse Pattern of “Chinese Philosophy”

The basic construction pattern of modern “Chinese Philosophy” was to interpret Chinese philosophy through western philosophical concepts. This can be demonstrated as a basic discourse pattern: Chinese A is Western B. Such a discourse pattern is called geyi 格义 (unsuitably matching terms from different languages for partial similarity) (Tang 2000, pp. 231–242; Chen 2001, pp. 159–187). For example: the Dao is rules; the Dao is rationality; the Dao is the absolute idea; Zhu Xi’s li理 (principle) and qi 气 (air, energy, essence) are the same as Aristotle’s form and matter; The Analects is political philosophy; The Analects is ethics; and so on. In the pattern of “Chinese A is Western B,” Chinese A is the subject and Western B is the object. As the relation between Chinese A and Western B is the same as that between A and B, we will discuss the statement “A is B” to examine the discourse pattern of “Chinese A is Western B.”

When we describe subject A as object B, we can see several characteristics in the pattern “A is B.” First, the subject is presented by the object. It is unconditional as it is the necessary way for the sentence to be meaningful. It has nothing to do with the correctness of the content of the sentence, (for example, “Birds are mammals.” “Birds are not mammals.”) or the position and knowledge background of the speaker. Second, in order that the statement “A is B” is an understandable and effective judgment (or interpretation, description), the object must be something with which both the speaker and the listener are familiar. That is to say, we use things that we are familiar with to understand things that we are unfamiliar with. In linguistics, the object is “understandable conventional language” or “subsistence language” (Deng 2009a). In the following discussion, only the first point will be used.

According to the way in which the sentence pattern “A is B” is meaningful, we know that when we use this pattern to understand A, what is revealed to us is only the object—“Western B.” That is to say, when we try to understand “Chinese A” with “Western B,” no matter what this “Western B” is, and whether the “Western B” looks accurate and proper to “Chinese A,” what we actually understand is the “Western B”; the world thus constructed will be a “strange-surrounding world” (Ni 1998). According to Feng Youlan, Dewey disagreed with this pattern of discourse. He said: “China is changing rapidly. If we continue to think about China in the old way of monarchism, we are as stupid as those who try to explain China by cutting Chinese facts and put them into the pigeon cages of Western concepts” (Feng 2001, p. 31). However, what puzzles us is that Feng Youlan, as a representative scholar following the way of interpreting the Chinese through the Western, never responded to Dewey’s warning, or reflected on his method of study. Even if Dewey’s opinion is incorrect, Feng should have given a response. How could he just neglect it?

Western philosophy was unable to respond to the inquiries of Chinese scholars, and hence was unable to supply a meaning of life for them. (In respect of the subsistence dilemma brought about by this discourse pattern) (Deng 2009a; 2009b, pp. 25–32). If one encounters a problem in life and the ideological source supposed to solve it is concerned with a Chinese A, and if people examine “Chinese Philosophy,” then according to the construction pattern of “Chinese Philosophy,” it will respond with “Chinese A is Western B.” In this way, the answer people get will never be “Chinese A,” but rather “Western B.” When people get the “Western B,” if they continue to inquire about the “Western B,” there will be two possible consequences. One is that the “Western B” cannot answer the inquiry effectively, and the response of “Chinese Philosophy” is ineffective. The other is that the “Western B” answers the inquiry effectively. In the first case, the response of “Chinese Philosophy” is worthless. In the second case, since the inquiry can be answered by the “Western B,” it will be stupid to turn to “Chinese Philosophy” and to get life instruction through the discourse pattern of “Chinese A is Western B.” Therefore in the second case, the response of “Chinese Philosophy” is evidently superfluous. To summarize, no matter what the content of Western B is, the response pattern of “Chinese A is Western B” covers up Chinese A and displays only Western B. For example, if the inquirer asks: “Why should I do good deeds? Will he who does good deeds be blessed by Heaven?” Let’s suppose that the answer of classical Yili Xue is: “The Heavenly Way assists no one but those with virtues.” No matter whether this answer is correct or not, the inquirer gets support for his question and hence constructs the meaning of doing good deeds. The typical response of “Chinese Philosophy” is expressed by the following statement of Mou Zongsan:

Heaven stays high above and is of transcendental significance. The Heavenly Way falls into the human body to be the human nature that makes human beings human beings. In this case, the Heavenly Way is immanent. Therefore we could use the terms that Kant favors to say that the Heavenly Way is on the one hand transcendent, and on the other hand immanent. (Immanent is the antonym of transcendent.) The Heavenly Way, being both transcendent and immanent, combines the sense of religion and morality. Religion stresses the sense of transcendence, while morality focuses on the sense of immanence. (Mou 1997, p. 21)

Mou’s answer, whether it is correct or not, is an interpretation of Chinese A. It directs the attention of the reader to Western B without responding to the inquiry.

Above is a logical analysis of the fact that “Chinese Philosophy” cannot enter the structure of inquiry-response-action of Chinese people because of its way of discourse and hence could not provide the meaning of life to Chinese people. The following passages of the paper will exemplify this conclusion with historical facts. Although historical facts alone also show that “Chinese Philosophy” cannot supply Chinese life with meaning, it is an imperfect induction, not a rigorous conclusion. Therefore, the use of historical facts in the following passages is also a verification of the above analysis; this use realizes the concordance of logical analysis and experiential facts.

4. “Chinese Philosophy” cannot Explain Folk Life

4.1. “Chinese Philosophy” cannot Explain Traditional Folk Life

After the Opium War, in the background of Sino-West distinction as a result of the contact with the West, the Western lifestyle was introduced into China and named as the “modern life (style),” while the local lifestyle of China was named as “traditional life (style).” Although the two lifestyles (hereinafter often abbreviated as “life”) co-exist in China, the former flourishes while the latter declines. The point here is that neither one takes the “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy” as its ideological source.

For those who stick to a traditional lifestyle, the ideological source that explains their life is still the Yili Xue. In other words, the ideological source of traditional life is still the Yili Xue. To make it brief: Yili Xue explains traditional life. (The Yili Xue and philosophy here and hereafter mentioned could, in many cases, be enlarged to cover, respectively, the traditional life and the western life.) For example, even today, many people who stick to a traditional life continue to sacrifice to all sorts of deities: the deities of the kitchen stove, of the door, of the earth, of the pigpen. They even offer sacrifices to strange flowers or odd stones, not to mention the fairies. (It should be specially pointed out that many people still adopt this lifestyle today, like my parents’ and grandparents’ generation.) Why do people offer sacrifices so extensively? What kind of idea dominates them? Who do they ask and how do they get the answers?

It is for life that people raise their questions. What does life here refer to? It refers to the daily life that has been passed down from one generation to another. When the filial generation inquires, the parental generation responds with their life experience. The life of the parental generation is the responder and the ideological source. The life of the parental generation is the practical application of the Dao. The response of the parental generation is the narration of life: “Life is like this: loyalty to the country, filial piety to the parents, harmony between husband and wife, respect and care for brothers, credibility to friends.” Of course, the life of the parental generation may be in an obscure state of the Dao; anyway, value judgment over a specific lifestyle is not discussed here. The obscure state of Dao does not form an impediment for the life of the parental generation to be the ideological source for the filial generation; it may well be a special ideological source—one that is daily in use yet unknown. Meanwhile, the inheritance of this life experience is more than the functioning of the Dao; it is the historical unfolding of the history-tradition, or the Dao. Although the specific life varies and even encounters the difficulty of getting no response, that to whom the inquiry points and who responds to it is the Yili Xue. Yili Xue is open to the inquiries of life. (It must be pointed out that many details in life such as everyday ritual proprieties do not directly concern interests, and will not generate life dilemma.) Although many people do not have enough knowledge as an inquirer and can neither recite classics of Yili Xue nor give scholarly interpretations, they have their own personal interpretation of the Yili Xue and thus make it their ideological source for constructing meaning.

With respect to language, the Yili Xue responds to the inquiries with the language of Yili Xue instead of with other languages. The language of Yili Xue is the language of life. If we pay attention to the glossaries of I Ching, Records of Rites, The Analects, Mencius, as well as Chen Chun’s Beixi Ziyi 北溪字义 (Northern Brook Glossary), Dai Zhen’s Mengzi Ziyi Shuzheng 孟子字义疏证(Commentaries and Proofing of the Glossary of Mencius), we will find that the language of the Yili Xue has a close relationship with the language of life. All the books, from the Sanzijing 三字经 (Three-character Canon), Qianziwen 千字文 (Verse of One Thousand Characters), Youxue Tongmeng 幼学童蒙 (Young Student Enlightenment), Shenglü Qimeng 声律启蒙 (Rhythm Enlightenment) to the Sishu 四书 and Fujing 五经, tell about the life of the Chinese nationality. The similarity between the language of Yili Xue and the language of life enables people to receive the education of Yili Xue consciously in schools and to be influenced unconsciously by the Yili Xue in everyday life. In this way Chinese culture transforms everyone under its influence. Therefore, the Yili Xue is in life. If the Yili Xue no longer shows in life, the Dao collapses. “The Dao loses its world and the world loses its Dao. The world and the Dao lose each other” (“Shan Xing” of Zhuangzi). On the other hand, if we pay attention to the language of “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy,” we will find that it is too remote from the traditional way of constructing meaning. Let’s take Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Tian Dao 天道 (the Heavenly Way) as an example. According to Mou Zongsan, when we inquire about the Heavenly Way, we are in fact inquiring about transcendence, as “the Heavenly Way is transcendent (or immanent).” We thus enter the realm of Kant and the Heavenly Way is transcendentalized (and we sink into the dilemma of a transcendental approach). Will such a way of interpreting the Yili Xue through western philosophy help us understand the Heavenly Way? It just makes us even more confused. What do the concepts “transcendent” and “immanent” mean? People without philosophical training won’t know these terms. As these concepts do not exist in everyday language, and Mou’s language will not become the language of life, how could people understand them? Therefore, the basic discourse pattern of “Chinese Philosophy” cannot draw people closer to Yili Xue; on the contrary, it pushes them farther away.

In sum, as traditional folk lifestyle never turns to “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy” for inquiry, the latter is not able to respond to life and the inquiry-response-action pattern of life becomes impossible.

4.2 “Chinese Philosophy” cannot Explain Modern Folk Life

In the same logic, “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy” does not explain contemporary life in China. Let’s discuss it briefly.

What is the ideological source of contemporary folk life? The answer is: western philosophy or western culture.

Science, democracy, liberty, equality, God, Christianity, capital, market economy, socialism, capitalism, class, rationality, philosophy, materialism, dialectics, all these modern concepts and the lifestyle implied in them have joined the life construction of contemporary China. However, these concepts do not need the help from “Chinese Philosophy.” The reason is clear. In modern life, people take western philosophy as the ideological source. They directly ask western philosophy “why” and “how” and it responds. No role is left for “Chinese Philosophy.” Since the ideological source of the “Chinese Philosophy” that interprets the Yili Xue is western philosophy, and the ideological source of modern life is also western philosophy—both have their origin in the West, why should modern life require “Chinese Philosophy”? Moreover, the beginning of modern life was prior to the establishment of “Chinese Philosophy,” and this explains why modern life can do without “Chinese Philosophy” as its ideological source. “Chinese Philosophy” does not become the ideological source it wanted to be. It is the western philosophy behind “Chinese Philosophy” that is enquired and that gives a response.

There are two tendencies in dealing with the relationship between tradition and modernity. One is to view and judge modern life through the Yili Xue (or the traditional life demonstrated as Yili Xue), and to absorb those parts that accord with the Yili Xue after reinterpretation. The other is to modernize the traditional life. That is, to view and judge the Yili Xue from western philosophy and to make selections from that perspective. In the context of strong West vs. weak Chinese, the latter is the major tendency. However, in whichever case, Chinese Philosophy is out of consideration. In fact, modern Chinese Philosophy itself is the result of the second tendency and is contained in it.

5. “Chinese Philosophy” Cannot Explain National Political Life

Before modern times, Chinese people used to engage the Yili Xue at moments of crisis or reform. The responses from the Yili Xue were then actualized, constituting the inquiry-response-action pattern in national politics. However, after modern times, because many people have lost confidence in the ability of the traditional form of government to confront western challenges, they destroyed it and established a modern form of nation (marked by the 1911 Revolution). In the transition from a traditional country to a modern country, the ideological source for reform was radically changed: It shifted to western philosophy (or western culture). A new form of inquiry-response-action came into being in which philosophy asks and responds and is turned into reform. Through factual examination and theoretical analysis, we find that the modern political construction of China had nothing to do with “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy.”

Firstly, before the 1898 Reform, the Yili Xue was the ideological source for political construction and “Chinese Philosophy” did not exist. Secondly, “Chinese Philosophy” had not yet been established at the time of the 1911 Revolution (The Department of Philosophy in Beijing University was established in 1914). Thirdly, the reforms after that sought ideological source unexceptionally from western philosophy, and the Yili Xue almost completely retreated from political construction. As a matter of fact, which one of the many designs of the subject “(History of) Chinese Philosophy” proposed by Hu Shi, Feng Youlan, Mou Zongsan was ever adopted as the ideological source of national political construction? Of course, as it is always easier to provide proofs for the existence of something than for the non-existence of something, this argument seems arbitrary. But logically, as mentioned above, modern “Chinese Philosophy” had no way to become an ideological source for political construction. “Chinese Philosophy” is neither the Yili Xue nor western philosophy; it is only the history of the academia that reinterprets the Yili Xue through philosophy. Such a history of academia takes philosophy as the criterion to eva luate the Yili Xue. Its legitimacy and the appropriateness of its name are doubtful. What’s more important, it did not and will not have original thought, as an inevitable consequence of the separation between its method and aims. Methodologically, since “Chinese Philosophy” takes an approach of external judgment (many people would substitute “judgment” with “criticism”), the judgment criterion (philosophy) for the judicator is unsurpassable. On the one hand, if the judicator does not break the criterion, he will not have original thought. On the other hand, if the judicator surpasses philosophy and breaks the criterion, his academic construction cannot be named as “Chinese” philosophy; it will be a development of Western Philosophy in China, which does not mean to interpret the Yili Xue through philosophy, but the self-interpretation of philosophy. Therefore, so long as western philosophy is the criterion, “Chinese Philosophy” is in a dilemma: either to surpass philosophy with its original thoughts and not to be “Chinese Philosophy” any longer, or not to surpass philosophy and be without original thoughts. Since “Chinese Philosophy” cannot produce original thoughts and its ideological source is from the west, why should the national political construction turn to it?

Someone may ask: Does not “making the past serve the present” propose a possibility for “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy” to take part in the construction of politics and modern life? Surely it is worth serious consideration. My answer is: In making the past serve the present, not only “Chinese Philosophy,” but also the Yili Xue, will not take part in national political construction, because it is essentially eva luating the Chinese with the Western. Several questions can be raised concerning “making the past serve the present.”

What does “the past” refer to? Obviously, it refers to the Yili Xue instead of the modern “Chinese Philosophy” established around the May 4th Movement. What does “the present” refer to? It refers to the modern life after the Opium War, especially the modern state political life, which took western philosophy as its ideological source. When we say “making the past serve the present,” we have discriminated between the past and the present, or the modern. Even though the past and the present are not opposite to each other, they are at least different. What does “serving the present” imply? It implies that the modern life will be the criterion in examining and judging the value of the Yili Xue. A corollary question is: What is the criterion in measuring the past with the present? Since “the present” refers to modern life, the criterion of measuring the past with the present will be no other than western philosophy. Thus, making the past serve the present leads to measuring the Chinese with the Western, which is exactly the same as interpreting the Chinese with the Western, pointing to philosophy or western culture as its ideological source. Although the construction mode of making the past serve the present is the same as that of “Chinese Philosophy,” the former does not turn to the latter for its ideological source. The relationship of the two modes is not one inheriting or following the other. Therefore, making the past serve the present does not provide a path for “Chinese Philosophy” to participate in political construction.

In making the past serve the present, classical Yili Xue also cannot participate in political construction. Obviously, because of the transition of the ideological source, a problem arises: which parts of the Yili Xue (thoughts and corresponding texts) could participate in political construction? The answer is: Those interpreted by and in accordance with Marxism-Leninism could participate in political construction. This can be extended as: only those thoughts reinterpreted by and in accordance with this ideology could participate in political construction.

In ancient time, the Yili Xue alone constructed state politics. The Yili Xue interprets itself, being free from interpretation, judgment and support from other theories; and other theories have to be interpreted and judged by it. It absorbs those thoughts in line with it, rejects those that are unfavorable, and tolerates those that are harmful. However, in modern times, the Yili Xue has to accept external criticism from the current political ideology[1] before it can participate in political construction. Only after being cut and selected by the ideology could it be allowed to serve the present. Therefore, the Yili Xue only appears to participate in political construction. What really participates in construction is the ideology. Therefore, when people think they are inquiring into the Yili Xue, it is the ideology that receives the inquiries and responds. Ideology is thus substituted for the Yili Xue. The process of substitution is (the process of) reinterpretation, during which classical texts, after being judged by the ideology, undergo a process of survival of the fittest. It is ideology instead of the content of the texts that decides which part of the texts will survive to take part in political construction. Some texts might have been useful in the past but become useless now, therefore in such a selection, the quality and usefulness of the texts make no difference; their fate depends on ideology. Even though some classical texts survive and take part in the construction, they are nothing but puppets—behind the curtain is the ideology that interpret-constructs political life and other life modes. For example, as Marxism-Leninism pays attention to dialectics, whether the text can be reinterpreted as and in accordance with dialectics becomes a criterion for selection, under which some paragraphs of Laozi or I Ching survive. In some textbooks, the verses such as—“Misery! Happiness is to be found by its side; Happiness! Misery lurks beneath it”; “Existence and non-existence give birth the one to (the idea of) the other; that difficulty and ease produce the one (the idea of) the other; that length and shortness fashion out the one the figure of the other; that (the ideas of) height and lowness arise from the contrast of the one with the other; that the musical notes and tones become harmonious through the relation of one with another; and that being before and behind give the idea of one following another”—are even praised to be with the spirits of dialectics. It appears that Laozi influences the construction of life, but the fact is that the dialectics does. It makes no sense whether there are elements of dialectics in Laozi or not. The Yili Xue merely functions as a medium for implementing ideology. Therefore, the essence of making the past serve the present is measuring the Chinese with the Western; in politics, it is judging the Yili Xue and constructing life with western ideology.

The substitution logic of making the past serve the present is also the basic construction method of “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy.” For example, Mou Zongsan tried to reconstruct Confucianism through Kant’s philosophy and made Confucianism once again legitimate and justified (in certain sense). The reason of his turning to Kant is, fundamentally, the predominance and discourse hegemony of the West in modern world history and world order. As Kant is highly influential in Western Philosophy, Mou thought that the reinterpretation of Confucianism through Kant would reinforce the legitimacy of Confucianism. However, again, in this way he only proved the universality of Kant’s philosophy through the Yili Xue. What really responded to (Mou Zongsan’s) inquiries is still the final supplier of the ideological source—Kant’s philosophy. Such a way of interpreting the Chinese through the Western is the modern retrospection and projection of the history-tradition and ancient academics.

Therefore, we can point out that although many scholars participated in constructing “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy,” it is neither the ideological source of their academic establishment, nor that of their life meaning construction. What they have done is discuss how to interpret the Yili Xue with philosophy more delicately. Even if some scholars cross-examine as they ask, trying to make “Chinese Philosophy” their ideological source of life, “Chinese Philosophy” cannot respond to their inquiries; and the Yili Xue also cannot respond to their inquiries as it is at most a medium leading to philosophy. What responds to their inquiries can be no other than western philosophy, which is the ultimate un-retraceable ideological source. As for Mou Zongsan, who apparently adores Confucianism, by interpreting Confucianism through Kant, he is in fact adoring Kant’s philosophy. Therefore, Mou Zongsan cannot escape the accusation of westernization. If the Xuan Xue thinkers in Wei and Jin Dynasties can be accused of “overtly adoring the Confucian sages but covertly valuing Laozi and Zhuangzi” because they interpreted Confucianism through Daoism, can we say those scholars who interpret Chinese learning with western learning “overtly adore Chinese learning and covertly value Western learning”?

Moreover, “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy” cannot effectively inherit academic learning (Deng 2009c). And the categorical arrangement involved in “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy” is not as good as Historical Document Studies. It is not only that it deals with a narrow scope of documents, but also that the method it uses is different from the traditional way—it selects documents according to philosophical criterion, producing categories such as “History of Metaphysics in China,” “History of Dialectics in China,” or “History of Atheism in China.” The legitimacy of this method is also doubtful.

To summarize, the legitimacy of the methodology of interpreting the Chinese through the West in modern “Chinese Philosophy” and of the related discourse pattern has long been doubted, as it alienates people from the Yili Xue rather than drawing them closer.

There are additional conclusions that can be drawn from the above arguments. However, this is not the task of the present paper. The task of the present paper is to raise the question: Since “(Modern) Chinese Philosophy” can neither provide meaning to folk traditional life or folk modern life, nor to political life in modern China, nor to inherit academic learning effectively, what is its significance? And the more important question is: Where should “Chinese Philosophy” go?

References

Chen Chun (1983). Beixi Ziyi北溪字义 (Northern Brook Glossary). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju

Cheng Shude (1990). Lunyu Jishi 论语集释 (Collected Commentaries of The Analects). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju

Chen Yinque (2001). “Zhi Mingdu Xueshuo Kao” 支愍度学说考 (“Textual Research of the Zhi Mingdu’s Teachings”), in Jinming Guan Conggao Chubian 金明馆丛稿初编 (Primary Compilation of Miscellaneous Drafts of Jinming Guan). Beijing: Sanlian Shudian

Deng Xize (2009a). “Ziwo Guan yu Zita Guan—‘Zhongguo Zhexue’ Yanshuo Fangshi zhi Fansi” 自我观与自他观——“中国哲学”言说方式之反思 (“Viewing from the Self and Viewing from the Others: A Reflection on the Discourse Pattern of ‘Chinese Philosophy’”). Huanan Shifan Daxue Xuebao, Vol. 6, p15-23

Deng Xize (2009b). Wenhua Fuxing Lun: Gonggong Ruxue de Jinlu 文化复兴论——公共儒学的进路 (On Cultural Revival: An Approach of Public Confucianism). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe

Deng Xize (2009c). “Duanlie yu Chuancheng: ‘Zhongguo Zhexue’ de Xuetong Wenti” 断裂与传承：“中国哲学”的学统问题 (“Breaking and Inheriting: The Lineage of ‘Chinese Philosophy’”). Xueshu Jie, Vol. 6, p214-225

Feng Youlan (2001). Sansong Tang Quanji 三松堂全集 (Complete Works of Sansong Tang), Vol.13. Zhengzhou: Henan Renmin Chubanshe

Guo Qingfan (1961). Zhuangzi Jishi 庄子集释 (Collected Commentaries of Zhuangzi), Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju

Kong Yingda (1990). Zhouyi Zhengyi 周易正义 (Rectified Connotation of Zhou Yi). Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe

Laozi (1980). Laozi, in Wang Bi Ji Jiaoshi 王弼集校释 (Collected Writings of Wang Bi, with Collations and Annotations), ed. by Lou Yulie. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju

Levenson, R. (1968). “The Problem of Historical Significance,” in Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy, Vol. 3. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press

Mou Zongsan (1997). Zhongguo Zhexue de Tezhi 中国哲学的特质 (Features of Chinese Philosophy). Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe

Ni Liangkang (1998). “Jiaohu Wenhua Lijie zhong de ‘Geyi’ Xianxiang” 交互文化理解中的“格义”现象 (“The Phenomenon of Geyi in Intercultural Understanding). Zhejiang Xuekan, 2: 22–28

Tang Yongtong (2000). “Lun ‘Geyi’” 论“格义” (“On Geyi”), in Tang Yongtong Quanji 汤用彤全集 (Complete Works of Tang Yongtong), Vol. 5. Shijiazhuang: Hebei Renmin Chubanshe

Wang Yangming (1992). “Chuanxi Lu” 传习录 (“Records of Instructions”), in Wang Yangming Quanji 王阳明全集 (Complete Works of Wang Yangming), Vol. 1. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] The ideology of Taiwan is not Marxism-Leninism. Therefore the Yili Xue is reinterpreted by its own ideology in Taiwan’s political construction. However, its logic is the same in that the Yili Xue is judged by western culture.